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I. INTRODUCTION
Oakdale, Louisiana is a small town of 6,837 people.' The Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) Federal Detention Center in Oakdale holds one
thousand immigrants, and the Oakdale Federal Corrections Institution holds
three hundred immigrants.2 These immigrants are in Oakdale because aliens,3
even legal permanent resident aliens, who are convicted of crimes are
deportable. 4 The INS transfers immigrants to this remote detention center to
expedite their removal. 5 Once moved to the Oakdale facility, indigent
* This Case Comment received the 1996 Rebecca Topper Memorial Award as the
third year writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohdo State Law Journal. The
author would like to express her gratitude to the following people for their help and
assistance: Manuel Vargas, Judy Rabinovitz, Stanley Mailman, and David S. Bloomfield.
1 See THEWORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OFFACrS 1995, at 398 (1990 census figures).
2 These numbers are approximate and were provided to the author. Telephone
interview with Russ Bergeron, INS Press Information Officer (Jan. 18, 1996).
3 This Case Comment will use the terms "alien" and "immigrant" interchangeably,
although some commentators find the term alien derogatory or stigmatizing, and others find
the term immigrant overbroad or confusing. This Case Comment seeks to avoid both sets of
criticisms by treating the words identically.
4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994) lists criminal and related grounds for exclusion.
Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) lists criminal grounds for deportation. For an
explanation of the distinction between exclusion and deportation in immigration law, see
infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
In the current anti-immigrant political climate, state officials are working together with
federal officials to speed the deportation of aliens convicted of crimes. See Stanley
Mailman, Early Parole for Deportation and the Right to a Lawyer, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 23,
1995, at 3.
5 On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act into law. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (hereinafter AEDPA).
The Act makes significant and harsh changes in immigration law. It provides, in pertinent
part:
Any final order of deportation against any alien who is deportable by reason of
having committed a criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii)(B), (C), or (D),
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immigrants have virtually no opportunity to obtain counsel.
Immigrants in deportation and exclusion proceedings have a right to
counsel at no expense to the government, 6 and the immigration judge is
required to give the immigrant a list of low cost legal providers. 7 But in
or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are
covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any court.
AEDPA, §440(a)(10) (1996).
Not only does the Act purport to cut off judicial review, but it significantly curtails the
availability of 212(c) relief. The Act eliminates 212(c) relief for any alien who is
deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in sections
241(a)(2)(A)(iil)[aggravated felony]; 241(a)(2) (B)[controlled substances];
241(a)(2)(C)[firearm offenses]; 241 (a)(2)(D)[miscellaneous crimes]; or any offense
covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii)[multiple criminal convictions] for which both
predicate offenses are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)[crimes of moral turpitude].
AEDPA § 440(d)(1996)(bracketed information added by the author).
The President and Congress have been planning to streamline the removal ofimmigrants convicted of crimes for some time. "The President's directive of February 7,
1995 to Executive Departments and Agencies calls for... further expediting the
identification and removal of criminal aliens." Containing Costs of Incarceration of Federal
Prisoners and Detainees: Prisons and Related Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, State, and Justice of the House Appropriations Comm., 104th Cong. 1062-63
(1995) (testimony of James A. Puleo, Executive Associate Commissioner for Programs at
the INS). Puleo reports that "in FY [fiscal year] 1994 the INS deported 21,992 criminal
aliens. We expect to double the number of criminal aliens deported in FY 1996, increasing
the number to over 58,000." Id. In addition, the budget proposal for 1996 calls for "an
additional 1,836 non INS detention beds in state, local, and contract facilities, as well as 976
beds in INS Service Processing Centers-a 48% increase in bed space over FY 1995."
Removal of Criminal and llegal Aliens: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Irmmigration and
Caims, 104th Cong. 14 (1995) (testimony of Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, INS).
6 Immigrants have "the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the
Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall
choose." Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 C.F.R. §§ 242, 292 (1995), 8 U.S.C.
[hereinafter INA] §§ 1252, 1362 (1994).
7 8 C.F.R. § 242.1(c) provides that the Attorney General shall compile lists (updated
not less than quarterly) of persons who have indicated their availability to represent pro
bono aliens in proceedings under section 292a. Such lists shall be made generally available.
See id.
In addition, 8 C.F.R. § 292a. 1 provides that
[d]istrict directors and officers-in-charge shall maintain a current list of organizations
qualified under this part... , located within their respective jurisdictions, for the
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Oakdale, that list contains just twelve private attorneys8 and only two free
providers. 9 Many of the attorneys are located out of town and take as few as
one pro bono case a month.' 0 There is a paucity of free legal services for
immigrants in Oakdale, and as a result, the right to counsel is illusory.I
Nelson Gandarillas-Zambrana is one of the thousands of immigrants that
have been incarcerated at the Oakdale facility. He was transferred from his
home in Virginia (just outside of Washington, D.C.) to the Oakdale facility,
over one thousand miles away from his family, friends, employer, and others
who could have helped him obtain an attorney. 12 His case presented this
question: does the INS violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
by the arbitrary change of venue for a deportation hearing to a location where
the alien has no contacts and little opportunity to obtain counsel and present
evidence? 13 In Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals,14 the
purpose of providing aliens in deportation or exclusion proceedings with a list of such
organizations as prescribed in this chapter.
However, in 1982, Congress forbade Legal Services Corporation (LSC) grantees (legal
aid offices) from helping most immigrants. See 45 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (1995). So, immigrants
are for the most part limited to non-LSC organizations, pro bono attorneys, and LSC
organizations that are able to separately fund their immigration representation. See id.
§ 1626.3(b)(3).
8 Craig Wilson, David A. Barnett, and Kerry Bretz are located in New York City;
Alfred Zucara, Jr. and Kenneth Panzer are located in Florida; R. Travis Douglas is an
Arizona attorney; Saundra D. Alessi is in Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Leo Jerome Lahey is in
Lafayette, Louisiana; and only three lawyers on the list are actually in Oakdale, Louisiana:
Todd Nesom, Joel G. Davis, and Jose W. Vega.
9 The two free providers are the New Orleans Pro Bono Project (two hundred miles
away) and the Farmworkers Legal Assistance Project of Lafayette (sixty miles away and
restricted to documented farmworkers only). The list is on file with the author and is also
available from the Office of the Immigration Judge at P.O. Box 750, Oakdale, Louisiana
71463.
10 Telephone interview with Jose Vega (Jan. 8, 1996) (attorney on the list);telephone
interview with Todd Nesom (Jan. 9, 1996) (same).
" Nationally, approximately 78% of detainees at service processing centers go
unrepresented. See 170 George Anderson, Defending the Immigrant; Legal Aid
Organizations, 170 AMERICA 17, 19 (1994) (citing a 1992 U.S. Government Accounting
Office study). The Immigration Court in Oakdale does not keep records of the number of
unrepresented cases, nor can they venture an estimate. Telephone interview with Jackie Y.
Ballard, supervisor at the Immigration Court (Feb. 5, 1996).
12 See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1253-
54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
13 See i. at 1256. The case also raised the question whether the immigration judge
had abused his discretion by improperly weighing the positive equities in the case. See id. at
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Fourth Circuit answered that question in the negative, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
This Case Comment will address the reality of the situation faced by
immigrants transferred to remote processing centers. Gandarillas-Zambrana
will serve as an example of how the INS practice of arbitrary transfers deprives
aliens of their right to procedural due process. This Case Comment will show
that the right to counsel is rendered a legal fiction when the INS can arbitrarily
transfer aliens wherever it chooses.
Part II discusses Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizing the due process
rights of aliens. Section A begins with background information on the roots of
the due process rights of aliens. Then, Section B explains the modem view of
due process that is influenced by the balancing test used in other areas of
administrative law. Section C focuses on the importance of the right to counsel
as a procedural right. Section D explains that the constitutional mandate of
procedural due process is reflected in the statutory right to counsel, and thus
the statute must be read more expansively.
In Part III, the facts of the Gandarillas-Zambrana case are explained.
Then, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is explained. In Part IV, the Fourth
Circuit's opinion is analyzed in light of the immigrant's right to meaningful due
process. The court could have followed the Supreme Court's balancing test, it
could have read the statute more expansively, and it could have taken this
opportunity to clarify just what process is due to resident aliens. Instead,
Gandarillas-Zambrana illustrates our courts' failure to live up to the promise
of fundamental fairness. The INS transfers violate procedural due process and
statutory rights by effectively preventing access to counsel, evidence, and
witnesses. This Case Comment suggests that a fair proceeding must be held
somewhere with a nexus to the immigrant's life.
II. THE GRADUAL RECOGNiTION OF IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS
A. Plenary Power, Procedural Due Process, and the Old Line
Immigration law has been described as a "never-never land," 15 a
"constitutional oddity," 16 a place where courts resort to "phantom norms," 17
1257. However, this part of the opinion is beyond the scope of this Case Comment. Instead,
this Case Comment will focus on the arbitrary change of venue and access to counsel issues.
14 44 F.3d 1251 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
15 Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S. Citizens in
the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 U. HAW. L. REv. 61, 61
(1993).16 Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
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and the "neglected stepchild of our public law." 18 Immigration has attained this
dubious status because of the "plenary power" doctrine. The Supreme Court
has stated that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of
Congress more complete ... "19
Congress and the Executive have traditionally had plenary power over the
area of immigration, and judicial review of constitutional claims has
traditionally been very deferential. 20 This extreme deference to Congress led to
harsh results for immigrants for many years. In 1889, the plenary power
doctrine was born in a case that upheld a racially discriminatory law that
prevented longtime resident aliens from returning to the United States. 21 The
Court reasoned that federal immigration policy was a nonjusticiable political
question and abdicated review. 22
The reason for the plenary power doctrine is not self-evident in the
Constitution. Congress has the authority to devise a uniform rule of
naturalization, 23 but the exceptional deference toward Congress was a judge-
made doctrine. Various theories have been advanced to support the plenary
power doctrine, such as the political question doctrine, the guest theory, and
the sovereignty theory. 24
Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255, 255.
17 Hroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990).
18 I-Eroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 1625, 1631 (1992).
19 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) in 1952, and the latest comprehensive changes were made in 1990. Immigration
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
Congress has delegated its authority to the Executive branch, and the Attorney General
is in charge of the INS, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR). See INA § 1103(a) (1994), 8 C.F.R. § 103(a) (1995). The
INS and the EOIR are separate administrative agencies within the Department of Justice.
20 The constitutional right addressed by this Case Comment is the due process right of
the Fifth Amendment, which provides, "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, a.k.a. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889). This case also stands for the proposition that when a statute is later in time than
a treaty, the statute will prevail. See id. at 600. An 1880 treaty between China and the
United States would have allowed the laborers to return to the United States. See id. at 596.
22 See id. at 606. The Court stated that congressional decisions were "conclusive upon
the judiciary." Id.
23 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
24 For a thorough explanation and criticism of each of the rationales for plenary
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According to the political question doctrine, immigration law involves
foreign affairs, and thus the judiciary should leave it to the political branches. 25
The guest theory tries to justify judicial abdication of review by characterizing
the immigrant as a guest with no claim to the host's constitutional
protections.26 Finally, according to the sovereignty rationale, control of the
borders is an inherent right of the sovereign state.27 Thus, exercise of that
authority should be free of any strictures, even constitutional limitations. 28 The
plenary power doctrine has been roundly criticized despite these rationales. As
Professor Motomura explains,
I fhlly accept the view that the constitutional community must have boundaries
to establish itself in the first place .... and outsiders may justifiably not enjoy
the full incidents of membership .... My objection to the plenary power
doctrine is not that it functions to limit entry to our community, but rather that
it represents... a place in which the usual rules no longer apply.2 9
Even under the old line of plenary power cases, immigration law made a
distinction between aliens subject to exclusion proceedings and those subject to
deportation proceedings. 30 The distinction hinges on the legal fiction of
"entry." 31 Aliens who have not yet entered are excludable, whereas aliens who
power, see Legomsky, supra note 16, at 305 (predicting that the plenary power doctrine
"will be frankly disavowed" as soon as judges recognize that the doctrinal theories cannot
be defended).
This Case Comment will not attempt an exhaustive critique of these rationales, but only
mentions that these are tenuous reasons to abdicate judicial review of the individual
deportation case. As Legomsky puts it, "ITJhere is no need to throw out the baby with the
bathwater." ld. at 263.
25 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705-06 (1893).
26 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
27 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952).
28 See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212-14 (1953).
Even United States citizens lack full constitutional protection at the country's borders. See
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618-19 (1977). The Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures will not apply to persons crossing the border.
See i. at 621.29 Motomura, supra note 18, at 1704.
30 See generally, Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
31 "Entry" is defined very generally in the INA as "any coming of an alien into the
United States. ... ." INA § 1101(a)(13) (1994), 8 C.F.R. § 101(a)(13)(1995). However,
many entries are not deemed "entries" in immigration law. For instance, an alien paroled
by the INS into the country has not "entered." See Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 190. Also, a
resident alien who makes an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip abroad does not "enter"
when she crosses the border to return to the United States. See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374
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have entered are deportable.32 The distinction between these proceedings is
significant, because in deportation proceedings the government carries the
burden of proof and the alien has greater procedural rights.33
The Supreme Court has long maintained that immigrants seeking initial
entry at our borders have no procedural due process rights.34 However, even in
an exclusion hearing, returning resident aliens do have such a right.35
Furthermore, in a deportation hearing, the right to procedural due process is
well established. 36 However, this right to procedural due process was an empty
promise for many years. The following cases illustrate that whether in
U.S. 449, 462 (1963).
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, see supra note 5, changes the
definition of what it means to "enter" the United States. Section 414 of the Act states, in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, an alien found in the United
States who has not been admitted to the United States after inspection in accordance
with section 235 is deemed for the purposes of this Act to be seeking entry and
admission to the United States and shall be subject to examination and exclusion by the
Attorney General.
AEDPA §414 (1996). This section is to take effect on November 1, 1996. However, after
the passage of the AEDPA, the Senate voted to delete section 414. See S. Con. Res. 55,
104 Cong., (1996). The future of this provision is uncertain at this time.32 See generally, 2 CHARLES GORDON, ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 65.02[2] (Rev. ed. 1996); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACrICE 1-23 (3d ed. 1994).
33 See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 32, at 1-23.
34 See, e.g., Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Brownell v. We
Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206
(1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Lee Lung v.
Patterson, 186 U.S. 168 (1902); Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901); Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892). However, it could be argued that some
excludable aliens have a protected interest before they enter this country. For instance,
political refugees who seek asylum and are protected by international agreements may have
a protected interest.
35 See !leuti, 374 U.S. at 462 (determining that an innocent, casual, and brief
excursions outside of this country do not subject aliens to the harsh consequences of "entry"
upon their return); Kwong Ha Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (finding resident
alien returning from a voyage is a person within protection of Fifth Amendment, and that
status cannot be taken from him without an opportunity to be heard).
36 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,
534 (1952); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 138-39 (1945); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276, 279 (1922); The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1903).
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exclusion or deportation proceedings, aliens were at the mercy of legislative
plenary power over immigration.
The immigration cases before the 1980s demonstrate the harsh results of
the plenary power doctrine. For instance, in Galvan v. Press,37 the Supreme
Court stated that
[i]n light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as a
limitation upon all powers of Congress... much could be said for the view,
were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the
scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to
Congress .... But the slate is not clean.3 8
In Galvan, the Court deferred to Congress's plenary power over immigration
and allowed the deportation of a man who lived in the United States for over
thirty years, but had recently associated with the Communist party.39 The
Court emphasized stare decisis reasons for the endurance of the plenary power
cases. 40 Yet as one commentator has noted, "It is noteworthy, if not striking,
that the doctrine, a product of the same era as Plessy v. Ferguson, has faded so
little with the passage of time."41
With a similar zealous deference, the Court in Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei,42 proclaimed, "Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 43 In
Mezei, the alien had lived in the United States for twenty-five years but made a
trip abroad and was excluded on the basis of confidential information without a
hearing.44
37 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
3 8 Id. at 530-31 (emphasis added).
39 See id. at 530.
40 See id. at 531.
41 Motomura, supra note 17, at 554-55; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
legitimized official racial segregation as "separate but equal." See id. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), repudiated this holding. The Court recognized that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. at 495.
For a discussion of Plessy and the factor that race has played in the framing,
ratification, and development of our Constitution, see DONALD E. LIVELY, THE
CoNsTrrUrIoN AND RACE 90-99 (1992). For a discussion of the racist roots of immigration
law, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 860 (1987) (noting that the
first immigration laws explicitly excluded certain races).
42 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
43 Id. at 212.
44 See id. at 208. Like many of the cases of this era, the decision occasioned an
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In Mathews v. Diaz45 the Court again allowed Congress to make a rule that
would have been unacceptable if applied to citizens.46 A Social Security Act
provision that denied benefits to aliens not meeting a five-year residency
requirement was upheld.47 The Court stated that no alien "can advance even a
colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty that a conscientious
sovereign makes available to its own citizens and some of its guests." 48 These
cases demonstrate the disturbing results which occurred when the Court unduly
deferred to congressional power over immigration, and they set the stage for
the changes in the 1980s.
B. Plasencia and the Modem Promise of Real Due Process
Nearly a century after its incarnation, the plenary power doctrine has
loosened its stronghold on immigration jurisprudence, at least for resident
aliens. Immigration law has moved from "never-never land" into the
mainstream of constitutional law. The procedural due process that was for so
long "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as
far as an alien denied entry is concerned," 49 has become meaningful due
process. The paradigm-shifting case was the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in
Landon v. Plasenca.50
Plasencia held that even aliens in exclusion proceedings could claim
procedural due process rights.5 Ms. Plasencia was returning from a trip
abroad and was deemed excludable because her departure from this country
was meaningful.5 2 Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, explained that
impassioned dissent. Justice Jackson stated, "The Government all but adopts the words of
one of the officials responsible for the administration of this Act who testified before a
congressional committee as to an alien applicant, that 'He has no rights.'" Id. at 221
(Jackson, J., dissenting). He went on to compare INS detention policy to "the 'protective
custody' of the Nazis more than of any detaining procedure known to the common law." Id.
at 226.
45 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
46 See id. at 80.
47 See id. at 87.
48 Id. at 80 (emphasis in original).
49 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (quoting
Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,544 (1950)).
50 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
51 See id. at 32-34. For more background on the case, see Alaine R. Parry, Comment,
Ensuring Due Process in Alien Exclusion Proceedings After Landon v. Plasencia, 34
HAsrIcs L.J 911 (1983).
52 She was not making an "innocent, casual, and brief" trip abroad, as described in
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449, 462 (1963). See supra note 31. Thus, her return was an
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Our cases have frequently suggested that a continuously present resident alien
is entitled to a fair hearing when threatened with deportation and, although we
have only rarely held that the procedures provided by the executive were
inadequate, we developed the rule that a continuously present permanent
resident alien has a right to due process in such a situation.53
The Court noted that "the constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided in
any situation" will vary with the circumstances. 54 To determine just how much
process is due the alien, the Court turned to the balancing test of Mathews v.
Eldridge.55
Mathews and Goldberg v. Kelly5 6 are the principle cases in what has been
called the due process revolution of the 1970s. Goldberg held that due process
requires a pre-termination evidentiary hearing for recipients of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) and recipients of financial aid from New
York's Home Relief program. 57 Mathews held that a full evidentiary pre-
termination hearing is not required for recipients of social security disability
benefits. 58 Both cases used a balancing approach to due process in the
administrative law context. Plasencia brought the balancing approach from
other areas of administrative law into the realm of immigration law.
Mathews describes three factors for the courts to examine:
First, the private interest that will be affected... ; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest.., and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the [state] interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 59
Justice O'Connor discussed the application of the Mathews test to
Plasencia, but declined to draw any conclusions. 60 O'Connor explained,
Plasencia's interest here is, without question, a weighty one. She stands to lose
the right "to stay and live and work in this land of freedom." Further, she may
lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high among the
interests of the individual. The Government's interest in efficient
"entry" under the entry doctrine, and she was subject to exclusion proceedings.
53 Plasenda, 459 U.S. at 32-33 (internal citations omitted).
5 4 1d. at34.
55 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
56 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
57 See id. at 270.
58 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 329.
5 9 Id. at 335.
60 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
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administration of the immigration laws at the border also is weighty. Further,
it must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immigration is
a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the Executive and the
Legislature.6 1
The case was remanded to the lower court to determine whether Plasencia
had indeed received sufficient due process. 62 Plasencia had challenged three
specific aspects of her exclusion proceedings: the allocation of the burden of
proof, the adequacy of notice, and the failure to inform her of the right to
representation. 63 Plasencia was litigated before the promulgation of regulations
requiring the immigration judge to inform aliens of the right to counsel.
O'Connor stated that precisely what procedure was due had not been
"adequately developed by the briefs or argument," and she declined to decide
the issue.64
Plasencia left open the question of just what process is due, but it did place
the question in the context of a balancing test. No longer could congressional
plenary power automatically trump an alien's interest in procedural due
process.
In 1993, the Court was presented with an opportunity to clarify the
parameters of the procedural due process right. In Reno v. lores,65 a class of
detained juvenile aliens sought prehearing release to responsible adults, or at
least an individual determination as to whether such release was appropriate. 66
They also claimed that as juveniles with little command of the English
language, they could not knowingly waive their rights. 67 Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court, construed away the procedural due process claim as "just the
'substantive due process' argument recast in 'procedural due process' terms,"
and rejected it with virtually no discussion.6 8 He went on to characterize the
substantive right involved as a right to be released to private custodians and
denied the claim. 69
61 lad (citations omitted).
62 See ia. at 37. Justice Marshall indicated that he would have decided the case and
would have determined that procedural due process was violated. See id. at 41 (Marshall,
I., dissenting).
63 See d. at 35-36.
64 Id. at 37 n.9.
65 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
66 See id. For more detail on the Flores case, see Gail Quick Goeke, Substantive and
Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L. REV. 221 (1995).67 See Flores, 507 U.S. at 306.
68 Id. at 308.
69 See a at 302.
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Mores presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify Plasencia, but the
Court declined. lores may be limited to the particular facts of the case. Justice
Scalia placed much emphasis on the fact that children were involved, and
"juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." 70 The
challenge to the INS policy of transferring immigrants to remote detention
centers presented the Court with another opportunity to explain just what
process is due to resident aliens. 71
C. The Importance of Access to Counsel
A salient aspect of procedural due process is the right to assistance of
counsel. 72 In a now famous article, the late Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Henry J. Friendly enumerated the traditional elements of a fair hearing,
and he included the right to counsel among the most important procedural
rights. 73
As important as the right to counsel is, the alien does not have the same
right to counsel as the criminal. 74 Deportation proceedings are not criminal in
nature, so criminal due process safeguards do not apply. In Fong Yue ing v.
United States,75 the Supreme Court refused to apply the Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments to deportation hearings. The Court stated that deportation
70 Id. (quoting Sehall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). The case may be viewed as a
blow for children's rights rather than as a blow for immigrants' rights.
71 More cases challenging this INS transfer policy are likely to follow. But, yet another
opportunity to address the parameters of Plasencia, and apply the Eldridge test may present
itself in the near future. Congress's recent antiterrorism initiative is likely to be challenged
as violative of procedural due process. See The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)(AEDPA). See supra notes 5 and
31. The Act provides for deportation of "terrorists" without allowing the accused to see the
evidence to be used against him. See AEDPA § 401(a)(1996). For a description of the
evolution of the alien's right to due process, as well as a detailed application of the
Plasencia test to the new law, see Jim Rosenfeld, Note, Deportation Proceedings and Due
Process of Law, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 713, 742-48 (1995).
72 "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69
(1932); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
73 See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1287
(1975) (ranking the right to counsel as number seven on his list of the top eleven rights).
74 The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
75 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
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is not a punishment for a crime, but merely a removal from this country. 76 To
this day, the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel is not available in
immigration proceedings. 77 For the immigrant facing deportation because he
has committed crimes while residing here,78 deportation seems quite like a
punishment for crime. Nonetheless, the right to counsel for immigrants is
rooted in the Fifth Amendment right to due process, rather than the Sixth
Amendment. As the Supreme Court has explained,
Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great
hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and
work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty-at times a most
serious one-cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the
procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential
standard of fairness. 79
This Case Comment will not argue for a right to counsel at the
government's expense. 80 The cases hinting at such a right will be explored only
to emphasize the importance of counsel in deportation hearings. For example,
in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,8s the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
"[w]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present his
position adequately to an immigration judge, he must be provided with a
lawyer at the Government's expense. Otherwise, 'fundamental fairness' would
be violated." 82
Likewise, in Escobar Ruiz v. INS,83 the Ninth Circuit explained that "[t]he
[F]ifth [A]mendment guarantee of due process applies to immigration
76 See id. at 709.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987).
78 The INA provides, "Any alien who at any time after entry is convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude... is deportable." INA § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).79 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
80 The argument has been made by many commentators, including: Irving A.
Appleman, Right to Counsel in Deportation Proceedings, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 130
(1976); Robert N. Black, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to Assigned
Counsel?, 8 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 289 (1975); Elizabeth Glazer, Note, The Right to
Appointed Counsel in Anlan Proceedings, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1157 (1985); William
Haney, Comment, Deportation and the Right to Counsel, 11 HARv. INT'L L.L 177 (1970);
David A. Robertson, Comment, An Opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to Counsel in a
Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REv. 1019 (1988).
81 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
82 JI at 569 n.3.
83 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, Escobar Ruiz v. I.N.S., 818 F.2d
712 (9th Cir. 1987).
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proceedings, and in specific proceedings, due process could be held to require
that an indigent alien be provided with counsel despite the prohibition of
section 292." 84 Even if due process does not require appointed counsel, it at
the very least should require that the government not impede access to counsel.
When a right as important as the right to assistance of counsel is at stake, the
government should not be allowed to take affirmative actions to deprive aliens
of this right.
The right to counsel is seriously affected when the alien is transferred far
from his home. In La Franca v. INS,85 the Second Circuit explained, "There is
no clear mandate in either the statute or regulations as to where a hearing
should be held," 86 but noted in a footnote that "[o]rdinarily the better
procedure would be to hold the hearing in the district of the alien's residence or
place of arrest. Obviously it should not be held in a district so far removed
from his residence or place of arrest as to deprive him of a fair hearing."87
These cases suggest that when the INS transfers aliens far from their residences
to a remote detention center in a small, Louisiana town, the INS deprives those
aliens of access to counsel, evidence, witnesses, and thus procedural due
process.
D. Sidestepping the Constitutional Question with the Statutes
The right to access to counsel is found in the Fifth Amendment right to due
process, 88 but it is also explicit in the Immigration and Nationality Act. The
Act provides that aliens facing deportation "shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to
practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose." 89
The statutory right to counsel reflects the constitutional mandate of due
process. In Rios-Berrios v. INS,90 the Ninth Circuit explained that "due process
mandates that [the immigrant] is entitled to counsel of his own choice at his
84 Id. at 1297 n.3. The "prohibition" in section 292 that the court refers to is implied
from the following language: "[The alien] shall have the privilege of being represented (at
no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings,
as he shall choose." INA § 1362 (1994), 8 C.F.R. § 292 (1995).
85 413 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1969).
86 Id. at 689.
87 Id. at 689 n.9 (emphasis added).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 20.
89 8 C.F.R. § 292 (1995), INA § 1362 (1994).
90 776 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1985).
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own expense under terms of the [NA] .... 91
However, the Act also provides that the INS has the authority to transfer
aliens. 92 Thus, the transfer issue could be approached as a matter of statutory
interpretation. The issue becomes how the courts are to harmonize these two
statutes, and how expansive the INS authority to transfer is under the Act.
The Supreme Court has explained that when interpreting immigration
statutes, "[e]ven if there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the
statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien." 93 The Supreme
Court has also explained that "since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom
beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible
meanings ... "94 Furthermore, a statute that is intended to "ameliorate
hardship and injustice" should not be construed restrictively or technically to
frustrate its ameliorative purpose.95
The statutory right to counsel must be read expansively if it is to have real
meaning. It cannot mean merely that one has a right to counsel when one is
likely to prevail on the merits. Effective deprivation of counsel does not require
a showing of prejudice. 96 In Montilla, the immigration judge asked the alien
whether or not he wished to have counsel, and the alien stated that he didn't
91 Id. at 862.
92 See INA § 1252(c). "The Attorney General is authorized and directed to arrange for
appropriate places of detention for those aliens whom he shall take into custody and detain
under this section." Id.
93 INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966).
94 Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).
95 See Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151, 152-53 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Wadman
v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 1964)).
96 See Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing denial of 212(c)
relief because alien was denied right to counsel); Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295
(7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting harmless error rule); Chlomos v. INS, 516 F.2d 310, 314 (3d Cir.
1975) (stating that it would not require showing of prejudice if confronted with the issue);
Yiu Fong Cheung v. INS, 418 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (finding a lack of counsel
inherently prejudicial to case); Molaire v. Smith, 743 F. Supp. 839, 848-49 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (rejecting harmless error rule where alien never knew he had right to counsel); see
also 1 GORDON, supra note 32, § 4.01[1].
However, the BIA has taken the position that there is no due process violation without
a showing of prejudice. See In re Santos, 19 L & N. Dec. 105, 107 (BIA 1985). The
administrative agency applies a "harmless error" rule, regardless of the law of the circuit.
See id. at 108. But see Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 863 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)
(criticizing the Santos rule of BIA).
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know what to do. 97 The judge granted a continuance, but when the immigrant
appeared unrepresented the second time, the judge went ahead with the
proceeding. 98 The reviewing court held that the agency must scrupulously
adhere to the right to counsel regulations, and held that the alien need not show
prejudice from the lack of counsel. 99 The court recognized that for the right to
mean something, it must be read expansively.
The statutory right to counsel reflects the mandates of due process and has
an ameliorative purpose. It should not be interpreted restrictively to frustrate
this purpose. On the other hand, the INS authority to transfer aliens is born
merely of administrative convenience. Congress could not have intended for the
INS to have the authority to deprive aliens of their right to counsel by
transferring them to remote locations.
In addition, the legislative history of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act indicates congressional intent to confer a right to immigrants, and not a
mere privilege. The legislative history reads, in pertinent part:
Regulations promulgated by the Attorney General for the conduct of hearings
must provide for adequate notice to the alien of the nature of the charges
against him and the time and place of the hearing; that the alien shall have the
right of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by counsel; that
the alien shall be permitted to examine evidence against him and to present
evidence .... 100
The right of being represented must mean at least that the INS cannot frustrate
access to counsel by arbitrary transfers. To interpret the statute to allow the
INS to transfer aliens to whatever place it deems convenient would work an
absurd result. 10' Congress would have granted a right that may be arbitrarily
taken away if the Government finds it convenient. It will always be most
convenient for the INS to ignore procedural due process and detain the alien as
far away from his home as possible.
97 Montilla, 926 F.2d at 164.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 168.
100 H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 57, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1712
(emphasis added).
101 The canon of statutory interpretation that requires the courts to avoid absurd results
was explained in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). There, the
Court interpreted a statute barring the importation of foreign laborers to be limited only to
manual laborers. The Court reasoned that to interpret the statute to also bar religious
workers would work an absurd result. See id. at 472.
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III. THE INSTANT CASE
A. The Facts of Nelson Gandarillas-Zambrana's Case
Nelson Gandarillas-Zambrana left Bolivia in 1981, when he was only
fifteen years old.'0 2 He entered the United States as a legal permanent resident,
and since then, he has lived and worked in the United States.10 3 His entire
family has relocated to the United States, including his elderly mother who
depends on his financial support. 104 He was convicted of two petit larceny
crimes in Virginia, and thus was served with an Order to Show Cause why he
should not be deported in March of 1993.105
An alien who is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, regardless of whether he has been confined for the crimes, is
deportable. 1' 6 To escape this harsh consequence, an alien may apply for
discretionary relief from deportation. 10 7 The immigration judge must consider
both the positive and negative equities in each individual case to decide whether
to exercise her discretion and grant the relief.'08 A familiarity with the cases
102 See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1253
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
103 See ad at 1254.
104 See id. The court stated that Gandarillas contributed $8000 to his mother's down
payment on her home, and he contributed to her mortgage payments. In addition, his
mother is unable to work due to a back injury. Yet, in the face of evidence that his mother
was, in fact, financially dependent on him, the court concluded that she was not.
Apparently, the court decided that his mother could turn to his siblings for support. See id.
105 See id. at 1253-54.
106 See INA § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
107 The 212(c) waiver of deportation is in the section of the INA relating to exclusion
grounds, not deportation grounds. It provides:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad
voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion
of the Attorney General without regard to [the grounds for exclusion] ....
INA § 1182(c), 8 C.F.R. § 212(c). Although on its face, the relief applies only to exclusion
proceedings, it has consistently been found applicable to deportation hearings as well. See,
e.g., Nunez-Pena v. INS 956 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1992); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d
Cir. 1976). Thus, the alien need not "proceed abroad" to be eligible for the relief.
108 The immigration judge is supposed to consider the following equitable factors: (1)
family ties within the United States, (2) residence of long duration, (3) evidence of hardship
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dealing with 212(c) relief, or a representative with such knowledge, would be
very helpful to the alien presenting himself before the judge. Gandarillas-
Zambrana had neither at his deportation proceeding.
The venue of his proceeding was originally set near his home in Virginia,
but the INS transferred Gandarillas-Zamnbrana to the Federal Detention Center
in Oakdale, Louisiana. The deportation proceeding was held in Louisiana in
December of 1993.109 He was not able to find counsel to represent him, he did
not have a Spanish translator, and he appeared in prison clothes. 110
Gandarillas-Zambrana told the judge that he wanted a lawyer, but he could not
find one in Oakdale. 111 Both the government's attorney and the immigration
judge questioned him. His application for 212(c) relief was denied by the
immigration judge. 112
An appeal was taken to the Board of Immigration Appeals. On January 6,
1994, the BIA issued a two sentence decision, 113 and ordered him deported.
Appeal was taken to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, but on January 20,
1995, the court affirmed his deportation. 14 Gandarillas-Zambrana petitioned
for certiorari, but review was denied.1 15
B. The Reasoning: Whatever Process INS Gave You Is Good Enough
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Gandarillas-Zambrana's
to respondent and his family, (4) service in the military, (5) history of employment, (6)
existence of property or business ties, (7) evidence of value and service to the community,
(8) proof of rehabilitation from criminal activity, and (9) other good character evidence.
The judge also considers the following negative factors: (1) nature and circumstances of
deportation ground, (2) any additional significant violations of immigration laws, (3) nature,
frequency, and seriousness of criminal record, and (4) other bad character evidence. See
Varela-Blanco v. INS, 18 F.3d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Marin, 16 L & N.
Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978)). These Marin factors are the standard accepted by federal
courts and the BIA.
The immigration judge's exercise of discretion is subject only to "arbitrary, capricious,
or abuse of discretion" review. Wojcik v. INS, 951 F.2d 172, 173 (8th Cir. 1991). Thus,
the immigration judge's initial determination at the deportation proceeding level is of vital
significance. An adverse ruling has little chance of being overturned, thus presence of
counsel may significantly change the ultimate outcome for the alien.
109 See Gandarillas-Zmnbrana, 44 F.3d at 1254.
110 See id. at 1255.
111 See id. at 1254.
112 See id. at 1254-55.
113 See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 10, Gandafillas-Zambrana (No. 94-1248).
114 See Gandanillas-Zambrana, 44 F.3d at 1251.
115 See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
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order of deportation. 116 The court stated that "[iln all the respects challenged,
the proceedings were conducted in accordance with governing statutes and
regulations .... " 1 17 This explanation echoes the infamous words, "Whatever
the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned." 118
The court stated that the INS has the right to transfer aliens from one
detention center to another." 9 Thus, there was nothing "inherently irregular,
not to say unconstitutional, about the transfer from Virginia to Louisiana." 120
The court said that the INA guaranteed the "same rights and privileges at a
deportation proceeding in Louisiana as it would elsewhere." 121 According to
this reasoning, the INS could transfer an alien literally anywhere, from ten
miles away to a thousand miles away, and would not be affecting his rights.
The court acknowledged that Gandarillas-Zambrana had the right to
counsel, but quoted from a case that construed that right as a mere
"privilege." 12 2 The statute uses mandatory language, 123 and Gandarillas-
Zambrana argued that Congress intended to confer a right to immigrants, not a
mere privilege.124
Nonetheless, the court minimized the right at stake, citing Committee of
Central American Refugees v. INS125 and Sasso v. Milhollan126 for the
proposition that the alien does not have the right to be detained "where his
116 See Gandarillas-Zambrana, 44 F.3d at 1259.
117 Id. at 1255.
118 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing
Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
119 See Gandarillas-Zmnbrana, 44 F.3d at 1256.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1256. See discussion infra notes 160-64 on how change of location can affect
rights of aliens, due to differences in circuit law, as well as differences in ease of retaining
counsel.
122 The court cited Delgado-Corea v. INS, 804 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1986), for the
statement that he had a "privilege of legal representation .... I d. at 262 (emphasis
added). This statement evokes the right/privilege distinction that is at the heart of the much-
criticized guest/host rationale for the plenary power doctrine. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
123 The Act provides, "Mhe alien shall be given notice .... the alien shall have the
privilege of being represented ... , the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine
the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf...." 8 C.F.R. §
242(b)(1)-(3) (1995), INA § 1252 (1994) (emphasis added).
124 See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 57, reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1712.
125 795 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1986).
126 735 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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ability to obtain representation is the greatest."127 The court stated that
Gandarillas-Zambrana did not retain counsel in Virginia before his transfer,
and that his "bald allegations" that counsel was unavailable did not establish a
violation of his due process or statutory right to counsel. 128
The court went on to state that a "lack of specificity" was fatal to
Gandarillas-Zambrana's claim. 129 The court would not find a violation of due
process because it was not sure how the venue affected his hearing. The court
stated that he "ha[d] not demonstrated any practical prejudice" resulting from
the inability to use live witnesses.130 Thus, the court refused to recognize that
the more than one thousand mile transfer to a remote location where
Gandarillas-Zambrana could not obtain counsel was per se prejudicial to his
case.
LV. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Should Have Followed Plasencia
The Fourth Circuit ignored the Plasencia holding. 13 When the court
stated that "in all the respects challenged, the proceedings were conducted in
accordance with governing statutes and regulations," 132 it essentially deferred
to the political judgments of Congress and the INS. This deference was
expressed in the Mezei decision: "Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 133
127 Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1256 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995). Contrary to the court's characterization, the
essence of Gandarillas-Zambrana's claim was not that he should have a right to be detained
where it was most convenient for him, he merely wanted a fair hearing in a location that
was not the least convenient.
128 See id. Gandarillas-Zambrana did not have time to obtain counsel before his
transfer to Oakdale, Louisiana. Contrary to the court's statement, this fact does not work
against him. Indeed, his transfer to Oakdale before he could obtain counsel in Virginia
effectively impinged his right to counsel. The court ignored the reality of the situation:
because he was transferred to this remote location, he was unable to retain counsel.
129 Id.
130 Id. The court noted that he could only present evidence in the form of letters and
documents, but did not acknowledge that live witnesses may have been more persuasive to
the judge. See iU.
131 See supra Part II.B.
132 Gandarillas-Zamnbrana, 44 F.3d at 1255.
133 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (citing
Knauf v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
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But unlike that 1952 exclusion case, here the court faced a long time green card
holder and a significant change in immigration jurisprudence.134
After Plasencia, procedural due process claims are to be evaluated
according to the balancing test used in other areas of administrative law.
Plasencia requires the court to examine "the interest at stake for the individual,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest.., as well as the probable
value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the interest of the
government in using the current procedures rather than additional or different
procedures."1 35
In Plasencia, the Court recognized that the immigrant's private interest is
"without question, a weighty one." 136 The interest in remaining with family
members, and the great liberty interest in not being banished to his country of
origin, must weigh heavily in the balance. Gandarillas-Zambrana was a legal
permanent resident for nearly fifteen years, and his ties to this country are
strong.
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the alien's liberty interest is
high if she proceeds without a representative at a remote location. The value of
additional or substitute procedures, such as holding the hearing near the alien's
home, is evident. The availability of witnesses in Virginia for Gandarillas-
Zambrana illustrates this point. If he had been represented at the deportation
hearing, he would most likely have been advised to move for a change of
venue. 137 In Virginia, he could have presented compelling evidence of the
equities necessary for 212(c) relief. He could have called family members, his
mother who depended on his support, his employer, the members of the
13 4 In addition, the INS transfer policy is not mandated by Congress; it is an action by
the administrative agency. Deference to the administrative agency when it is interpreting the
scope of its own authority is not called for by the Chevron doctrine. See infra notes 150-57
and accompanying text.13 5 Plasenca, 459 U.S. at 34 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
136 Id.
13 7 The alien must move for a change of venue; the court will not grant it
spontaneously. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.20 (1996). The party moving for the change of venue must
show "good cause." See In re Rahman, 20 I. & N. Dec. 480, 482-83 (BIA 1992) (setting
forth the factors the immigration judge will consider in changing venue). Changes of venue
should not be dispensed or withheld arbitrarily. See Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285, 1289
(9th Cir. 1994) (granting injunctive relief for a class of aliens from El Salvador and
Guatemala who had been routinely denied changes of venue by an immigration judge).
When the alien is able to obtain counsel and moves for a change of venue, the INS still
tries to prevent his access to counsel. The INS is currently routinely opposing motions for
changes of venue. Telephone interview with Manuel Vargas, Supervising Attorney of
Immigration Law Unit of Legal Aid Society (Feb. 26, 1996).
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nonprofit dance troupe he belonged to, law students from the Georgetown
Street Law Project in which he participated as a volunteer, and perhaps
others.138 A judge with this evidence of positive equities and rehabilitation
before her would be more likely to grant relief than a judge one thousand miles
away who has seen none of this evidence. The risk of an erroneous deprivation
is further heightened by the difficulties of language faced by Gandarillas-
Zambrana and many other immigrants.
Third, the governmental interests-the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute requirement would entail-should have been
examined. The plenary power doctrine is a mere factor in this analysis; it is not
dispositive. In Louis v. Meissner,139 a federal court stated:
The only harm that could result to defendants as a result of the issuance of a
temporary restraining order [preventing similar transfers to a Florida facility]
consists of administrative inconvenience .... Such administrative
inconvenience is, of course, of no consequence in comparison to the potential
losses which the plaintiffs may suffer .... 140
The court went on to explain that the transfer policy of the INS
subjected [the aliens] to a human shell game in which the arbitrary
Immigration and Naturalization Service has sought to scatter them to locations
that, with the exception of Brooklyn are all in desolate, remote... areas,
containing a paucity of available legal support and few, if any, Creole
interpreters. In this regard, INS officials have acted as haphazard as the rolling
seas .... 141
Furthermore, the nation's sovereignty is not implicated here. Gandarillas-
Zambrana's case has very little to do with the national security or sovereignty
rationales that traditionally support the plenary power doctrine. Therefore, the
government's plenary power over immigration should not weigh heavily in the
balance here. 142 Neither mere administrative inconvenience, nor the sovereign
138 See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1254
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995).
139 530 F. Supp. 924 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
140 Id. at 928-29.
141 Id. at 926 (emphasis added).
142 When Justice O'Connor articulated the interests involved in the Plasencia case, she
labeled each interest "weighty." Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). The alien's
interest in remaining in the U.S. is "weighty," the right to family unity is "weighty," and
the government's interest in border control is also "weighty." See id. But, Plasencia does
not stand for the proposition that the government's plenary power over immigration is the
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prerogative over immigration matters, outweigh the substantial interests of a
long time resident alien in Gandarillas-Zambrana's situation.
By ignoring the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit has shortchanged immigrants' rights. Procedural due process
requires more in a situation such as Gandarillas-Zambrana's than an empty
right to counsel where none, or nearly none, are available.
B. The Court Should Have Read the Statute to Mean Something
The court viewed the statutory right to counsel as a right to a hypothetical
counsel who may or may not exist. The court had no problem with the INS
transferring the immigrant thousands of miles from his home, family, friends,
and employer, to a place with a paucity of legal representation. If this is all the
"right to counsel" means, then why is it there at all?
The court could have focused on the statutory right to counsel, avoiding
the constitutional problem. The Immigration and Nationality Act gives the INS
the authority to transfer aliens, 143 and it gives the aliens a right to counsel. 144
At some point, these two provisions conflict. The court should have recognized
that the INS authority to transfer is not limitless. 145 When the alien is
transferred to a remote location where there is a paucity of free or low cost
legal counsel, that transfer effectively impinges on the right to counsel.
The immigrant's statutory right to counsel has been interpreted by the
federal courts to encompass notice of the right, 146 a reasonable opportunity to
obtain representation, 147 and protection from waivers of the right that are made
most weighty factor.
143 See INA § 1252(c) (1994).
144 See INA § 1362, 8 C.F.R. § 292 (1995).
145 Gandarillas-Zambrana points out that the INS position leads to absurd results
because "following this line of thinking it is quite acceptable to transfer such Petitioner to
Nome, Alaska; Hawaii; Guam; Puerto Rico; Outer Mongolia; or the moon for that matter."
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Gandarillas-Zmnbrana (No. 94-1248). The Fourth Circuit
relied on Sasso v. Milhollan, 735 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990) for the proposition that
the INS has broad discretion to transfer aliens, but Gandarillas-Zambrana argued that this
discretion must have some limit.
146 See, e.g., Villegas v. INS, 745 F.2d 950, 951 (5th Cir. 1984) (determining that if
immigrant was not informed of right to counsel, the case would be reopened on remand
whether or not prejudice to the alien was shown).
147 See, e.g., Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that
continuances granted to the alien to give him time to get counsel were not sufficient because
they only gave him two business days); see also Chlomos v. INS, 516 F.2d 310, 314 (3d
Cir. 1975) (determing that a refusal to grant immigrant's request for a change of venue
impeded his access to counsel). But see Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1995)
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without full understanding. 148 However, when the alien is transferred to a
remote processing center like Oakdale, she is given a list of counsel who will
probably not travel to her location. She may get a continuance in order to
fruitlessly call the counsel on the list, but when all attempts to obtain counsel
fail, the alien is deemed to have "waived" the right to counsel by appearing
without one.
A more expansive reading of the statutory right to counsel is consistent
with canons of interpretation traditionally applied to immigration law.
Ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the alien, 149 because the liberty at
stake is great, and the statute is intended to provide relief for immigrants. 150
Indeed, deportation may deprive the alien of "all that makes life worth
living.' 51
A more expansive reading of the statutory right to counsel is also
consistent with the Chevron doctrine.152  Chevron requires deference to
administrative agency interpretations in limited instances, but not when the
agency is determining the scope of its own authority.' 5 3 Congress does not
mandate the INS transfer policy; it is an action by the administrative agency.
The INS interpretation of its authority to transfer aliens to whatever facility it
so chooses is not reasonable. It cannot be a reasonable interpretation of the
(holding that a refusal to grant a change of venue impeded access to counsel, yet was
harmless error).
148 See CastroO'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a
"laconic answer" not an intelligent and voluntary waiver of right to counsel). However,
other circuits do not require such a high standard. For instance, the Eighth Circuit held that
a mass simultaneous waiver by fifty-two immigrants, who were not individually questioned
by the judge, was indeed an effective waiver of the right to counsel. See United States v.
Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 237 (8th Cir. 1988).
149 See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966).
150 See a
151 Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,284 (1922).
152 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Chevron requires that where Congress has not addressed the meaning of a statute,
the courts should defer to reasonable agency determinations of meaning. See id. at 843-44.
However, deference is not applicable where the statute is clear, where congressional
intent is discernable, or where the agency is clearly wrong in its interpretation. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987) (reversing agency's application of incorrect
standard of proof in asylum claims). In Cardoza-Fonseca, the court made a distinction
between "well-founded fear of persecution" and "clear probability of persecution," and did
not allow the INS to determine the meaning of the admittedly "ambiguous" statute. Id. at
448-49.
153 See id. at 448.
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statutory grant of authority, 154 because it conflicts with the explicit
congressional intent to grant aliens a right to counsel. 155 Thus, the transfers to
remote detention centers are per se violative of the right to counsel.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit imposed a "prejudice" requirement on
aliens asserting deprivation of the right to counsel. 156 The right to counsel
would not be violated without a specific showing of prejudice. One might ask,
why not have a prejudice requirement? If Gandarillas-Zambrana's lawyer could
not find him relief at the judicial review stage, what harm was done at the
deportation proceeding stage? The answer is threefold.
First, the review of the immigration judge's decision is for abuse of
discretion only. 157 This review means that the initial determination of the case
may seriously hurt the alien's chances on appeal. When the case is fact
intensive, the determination of the facts by the immigration judge can
effectively settle the matter.
Second, the judge can neither predict when prejudice will occur nor really
tell afterward if a case could have been better presented. A prejudice
requirement asks the judge to guess whether counsel could have changed the
outcome.
Third, counsel does in fact usually help the alien. 158 Counsel will be
familiar with the procedure to move for a change of venue, familiar with the
case law on 212(c) waivers, and familiar with other forms of relief.
154 See INA § 1252(c) (1994).
155 See INA § 1362, 8 C.F.R. § 292 (1995).
156 See Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1257
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 49 (1995). Additionally, in opposition to the petition for
certiorari, the Board of Immigration Appeals focused on the argument that without a
showing of prejudice there could be no violation of due process. See Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 3, Gandarillas-Zmnbrana (No. 94-1720).
157 See Arango-Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1994). An abuse of
discretion only occurs where a decision is made "without a rational explanation,
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as
an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group." Id. (quoting Li Cheung v.
Esperdy, 377 F.2d 819, 820 (2d Cir. 1967)). In addition, the immigration judge's decision
to deny a change of venue is overturned only for abuse of discretion. See Baires v. INS,
856 F.2d 89, 91 (9th Cir. 1988).
158 For example, in Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1991), on remand, and
after securing representation from the Legal Aid Society in New York City, the alien was
able to secure the 212(c) relief from an immigration judge. This case validates the Second
Circuit's position that lack of counsel is indeed per se prejudicial to the alien. Telephone
interview with Manuel Vargas, Immigration Law Unit of Legal Aid Society (Feb. 26,
1996).
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Furthermore, as the following example illustrates, sometimes in immigration
cases location is everything.
The importance of location is demonstrated by the case of Michael v.
INS.159 Michael was transferred from his residence in New York to Oakdale,
Louisiana, 160 where his application for 212(c) relief was denied. 161 The case
law of the Second Circuit differed from the case law of the Fifth Circuit in that
212(c) relief would have been available to Michael in the Second Circuit even
though he had a firearms conviction.162 On appeal, with the assistance of
counsel, Michael was able to obtain a stay of deportation because he was
deprived of the right to have Second Circuit law applied to his case.163 This
case demonstrates that the INS does indeed affect the immigrant's rights by
transferring him to another jurisdiction. 164 And it shows how the assistance of
counsel can have a tremendous impact on the outcome for the alien.
C. The Court Should Have Taken This Opportunity to Clarify the
Procedural Due Process Rights of Aliens
Many commentators have noted that immigration law is at a crossroads.
No longer does the incantation of the plenary power doctrine excuse the courts
from reviewing the constitutional claims of aliens. 165 But it is yet unclear just
what process is due in the modem era. Gandarillas-Zambrana's attorney stated
159 48 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 1995).
16 0 This transfer moved his case from the Second Circuit to the Fifth Circuit.
161 See Michael, 48 F.3d at 662.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 Another example of the different treatment aliens may receive in different circuits
is illustrated in Rosendo-Ramirez v. 1NS, 32 F.3d 1085 (7th Cir. 1994). In the Fifth Circuit,
a resident who crosses the border without inspection is not deportable unless the crossing
was an "entry" within the meaning of Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). See supra
note 31. But in the Seventh Circuit, the F/euti entry doctrine will not apply to any alien in
deportation proceedings for entering without inspection. See Rosendo-Ramirez, 32 F.3d at
1090.
165 Motomura writes:
Many of the immigration cases of the past decade reflect a broad effort by aggrieved
aliens and their sympathizers to make up for a century of inactivity by exposing
congressional and executive agency decisions to the judicial scrutiny that we have come
to take for granted in other areas of law.
Motomura, supra note 18, at 1627.
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in his petition for writ of certiorari that "[a] proper development of
immigration law with respect to venue of hearings and right to counsel requires
that the Court answer the question posed by this case." 166
Just what process is due the alien in deportation proceedings? Just what are
the essential standards of fundamental fairness for the alien? The Supreme
Court has yet to clarify the parameters of the resident alien's due process
rights, and the lower courts are not picking up the slack.' 67
Gandarillas-Zambrana provided the Fourth Circuit an opportunity to live
up to the promise of fundamental fairness. It was an opportunity to further the
evolution of immigration law into the mainstream of constitutional law, but the
court declined.
V. CONCLUSION
Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals represents the
Fourth Circuit's willful blindness to the reality of the situation faced byimmigrants in remote detention centers. The decision harkens back to a day
when the plenary power doctrine made little exception for procedural due
process. After Plasencia, the immigrant's right to due process is informed by
the balancing test applicable to other areas of administrative law. When the
courts take a hard look at the liberty interest hanging in the balance, the INS
claims of administrative efficiency should be seen for what they are: an
infringement on the alien's right to counsel and procedural due process.
Therefore, the INS policy of transferring aliens to locations where the aliens
have no contacts and little opportunity to obtain counsel and present evidence
should stop.
166 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Gandarillas-Zmnbrana (No. 94-1720).
167 See Ray D. Gardner, Note, Due Process and Deponation: A Critical Examination
of the Plenary Power and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
397, 398-99 (1981) (arguing that the amorphous Supreme Court jurisprudence has led to
confusion, and in some jurisdictions aliens are found to have been denied due process only
in cases of extreme injustice, whereas in other jurisdictions, mere prejudice is a violation of
due process).
1996] 1025

